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I. Appeal 
I am appealing the award of attorney's fees, specifically the reduction by 
seventy-five percent (75%) of the attorney's fees my wife and I actually 
incurred in this action, as being both against public policy and inequitable. 
Summary of facts: 
My wife and I, new residents of the State of Utah, built a home in 
2005 with the highest standards of on-time and courteous payment to all our 
contractors and vendors. When we discovered that Southwest had installed 
a bathroom countertop that was not what we had ordered (in terms of color, 
thickness or edge), we promptly brought the matter to Southwest's attention 
and made an arrangement with Southwest regarding the mistake. The 
arrangement, made with Southwest representative Mark Burnett, was that 
there would be no charge for the bathroom countertop. (Southwest did other 
work on our home, work for which it was promptly paid in full.) We 
subsequently learned that Southwest had placed a lien on our new home for 
the unpaid amount of the bathroom countertop. 
After several initial attempts on our part to resolve the matter 
amicably and privately went unanswered, my wife and I engaged counsel to 
help get the lien off our home and confirm resolution of the dispute. 
Although we ultimately prevailed at trial and were awarded damages 
on the contract claims in addition to our attorney's fees, the court awarded 
only $4,310.88 in attorney's fees, only twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
attorney's fees we actually paid (i.e., the $17,243.50), despite the fees 
having been, by all accounts including the Court's, reasonable. This 
reduction has worked a great injustice on my wife and me, individuals who 
were forced to litigate by Southwest's refusal to remove the lien from our 
new home. 
We look to this court for a determination that the amount of attorney's 
fees that should be awarded should be reconsidered and augmented to the 
full amount requested. We would ask to the Court to consider, in this 
regard, the fact that the trial court's original judgment (entered on May 7, 
2008) was in the amount of $19,177.00, a sum that did cover all of our 
attorney's fees. 
To date, Southwest has paid no portion of the trial award. 
Statement of issues: 
(A) Is the award against public policy? The award of attorney's 
fees - a total of $4,310.88 out of the $17,243.50 my wife and I (the 
prevailing party) actually paid - is against public policy in two respects: 
(1) It effectively denies litigants their right to trial. Ifwrongly-
liened parties, even those who prevail at trial, are to be punished to the 
extent of having to bear three quarters (3/4) of their attorney's fees, 
they may have to forgo their right to trial for financial reasons. This is 
surely an injustice in its own right. But in the instant case, where 
Southwest had put a lien on our newly completed home, a decision to 
forgo our right to trial might also have precipitated a wrongful 
foreclosure on our home. In short, if judges are going to reduce even 
reasonable attorney's fees to the point where prevailing litigants are 
effectively punished for vindicating their rights, then parties should 
not litigate any case where the amount in controversy is low because 
litigation to trial will of necessity cost multiples of the amount in 
controversy. This would mean there would be no avenue for 
vindication of property rights whenever the amount in controversy is 
low. 
(2) It encourages reckless lien practices. If wrongly-liened parties, 
even those who prevail at trial, are going to be punished by being 
awarded only a small fraction of their attorney's fees, bad actors may 
well be encouraged to place liens on property as an extortion method: 
The minute attorney's fees exceed the amount in controversy in a 
given litigation, awards like this one will effectively force plaintiffs to 
settle, at whatever cost to their property rights. This result is a 
subsidy to those who would abuse lien privileges or be reckless with 
them, and a real injustice to homeowners. 
(B) Is the award inequitable? The award of attorney's fees - a 
total of $4,310.88 out of the $17,243.50 my wife and I (the prevailing 
party) actually paid - is inequitable in the following respects: 
(1) The award does not address the fact that the Court itself ordered 
mediation, thereby increasing the plaintiffs' costs. A plaintiff should 
be able to assume that his court-ordered additional attorney's fees will 
be reimbursed in the event he prevails at trial. We complied with the 
court-ordered mediation, and we did so in good faith. But Southwest 
was unwilling to settle and because the lien remained on our home, 
we had no choice but to proceed to trial. In the end, we were 
penalized to the extent of these court-ordered additional fees and 
beyond. 
(2) The award does not address the necessity of the litigation to 
trial in this particular case. Because there was a lien on our home, we 
had no choice but to litigate to trial. But the trial court does not apply 
the case he cites (Trayner v. Gushing , 688 P 2d 856 (Utah 1984)) in 
his Order (regarding the "necessity of initiating an action to vindicate 
plaintiffs rights") to the facts of our case. Surely, this should have 
counted in our favor when in its discretion the court awarded fees. 
But the fact that we had no choice but litigate (given Southwest's 
refusal to remove the lien from our home) was not even mentioned. 
(3) The award misconstrues the import of the "Juperana Bordeaux" 
(i.e., color) question. While the award seems to place a lot of weight 
on our having lost on the question whether Southwest provided the 
right color marble, it elides the facts that (1) Southwest lost on the 
broader contract claims (i.e.. Southwest did not provide what was 
ordered in terms of edge and thickness even assuming it got the color 
right), and (2) Southwest's loss on the contract claims goes to the very 
heart of its loss on the lien claim (i.e., the lien was wrongly placed to 
the extent that we did not owe Southwest anything). We prevailed on 
the contract claims and on one lien claim, but are having to bear 
attorney's fees in an amount almost seven (7) times higher than the 
cost of the countertops we ordered and never received. This works an 
injustice on my wife and me. 
(4) The award does not balance the equities in a fair way. The 
court awards only one quarter (1/4) of the attorney's fees my wife and 
I requested because, it finds, attorney's fees were recoverable on only 
one of the four total claims in the action. But this mechanical 
reduction elides the facts that: (i) the "non-compensable" contract 
claims are indispensable to the compensable mechanic's lien claim on 
which we prevailed, (ii) there was significant overlap among all 
claims, (iii) the total amount of attorney's fees we requested was 
reasonable and in no event burdensome to Southwest, which itself 
precipitated the need for litigation to trial by wrongfully placing the 
lien on our home, and (iv) the disparity between the fees we requested 
($17,243.50) and the principal recovery ($1,565) was a function of the 
current rate for legal fees in the community and not a result of 
wasteful billing on the part of our trial attorney. We note with 
interest and regret in this regard that the trial court awarded our full 
fees in its original judgment dated May 7, 2008. 
Conclusion 
In view of the public policy ramifications of the trial court's award -
specifically, the effective denial of access to the Utah courts ~ and of the 
financial injustice worked on my wife and me by it, we look to this court for 
a determination that the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be 
reconsidered and augmented to the full amount requested (i.e., $17,243.50, 
in addition to the compensatory damages). We would ask the Court to 
recall, in this regard, the fact that the trial court's original judgment (entered 
on May 7, 2008) was in the amount of $19,177.00, a sum that did cover all 
of our attorney's fees. 
EL Motion to Be Excused from Standing Order No. 8 
As a layperson, I have done my best to comply with Standing Order No. 8. 
To the extent I have not met the Order's technical requirements, I move to 
be excused from Standing Order No. 8. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mel Bircoll, M.D. 
